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Abstract: This article argues that access to meaningful sexual experience 
should be included within the set of the goods that are subject to principles of 
distributive justice. It argues that some people are currently unjustly excluded 
from meaningful sexual experience and it is not implausible to suggest that they 
might thereby have certain claim rights to sexual inclusion. This does not entail 
that anyone has a right to sex with another person, but it does entail that duties 
may be imposed on society to foster greater sexual inclusion. This is a 
controversial thesis and this article addresses this controversy by engaging with 
four major objections to it: the misogyny objection; the impossibility objection; 
the stigmatisation objection; and the unjust social engineering objection. 
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Introduction 
“Sex is not a sandwich”1 and a “kiss is not a contract”2 — two quotes that 
capture received wisdom about the ethics of sex. The former captures the belief 
that sexual experience is not a good or resource that can be divvied up and 
shared among many people. The latter captures the belief that, when it comes to 
intimate interactions with other human beings, we need to nip any sense of 
sexual entitlement in the bud. No one is entitled to anything when it comes to 
sex.  
                                                                    
1 This quote comes from Srinivasan (2018) but is inspired by an essay originally written by Rebecca Solnit in 
which the disanalogy between sex and a sandwich is first proposed. See Solnit (2015). 
2 This is the title of a song by the satirical/parodic folk duo The Flight of the Conchords. The meaning of the 
song is ambiguous. While ostensibly about the nature of consent and the hollowness of casual sexual hook-ups, 
there are other lines within the song that might speak to male entitlement and justify a casual objectifying 
attitude towards women. 
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Both statements are ethical common sense and although this paper does not 
reject either claim, it does seek to moderate them to some extent. It does so by 
arguing for two theses. First, it argues that sexual experience (in the sense of 
both partnered and non-partnered sexual experience) is a good that can be 
evaluated in light of the principles of distributive justice. In other words, it 
argues that having access to meaningful sexual experiences is an important part 
of the good life, that some people are unjustly sexually excluded, and that we 
ought to think about this as a problem of distributive justice (or injustice, as the 
case may be). Second, it argues that thinking about sexual experience in these 
terms provides some justification for the idea that there is a ‘right’, or more 
properly a collection of positive and negative claim rights, to sexual inclusion. 
In other words, those who are unjustly sexually excluded may, under certain 
circumstances, have a right to have measures taken on their behalf to assist their 
sexual inclusion. This does not mean that they have a ‘right to have sex’ with 
other people — or that other people have a duty to have sex with them — but it 
does mean that steps should be taken to give them a reasonable opportunity to 
access meaningful sexual experiences. This can take the form of removing 
barriers to meaningful sexual experience (such as legal bans on certain forms of 
sexual expression) and facilitating positive sexual experiences (through, for 
example, education or technological aid). 
 
This article is not the first to defend or debate claims of this sort. There is, 
for example, a long-standing debate within the disability rights literature about 
the sexual exclusion of persons with disabilities and the possibility that they 
might have a right to sexual inclusion (Shakespeare 1999, de Boer 2014 & 
2015, Appel 2010, Di Nucci 2011 & 2017 & 2019, Thomsen 2015 and 
Liberman 2018, Firth 2019). There is also a long-standing strand within 
feminist theory that is deeply sceptical of any suggestion of rights and 
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entitlements to sex, largely on the grounds that patriarchal ideology already 
contains within it the belief that men have (or should have) a sexual claim right 
over the bodies of women and that this needs to be resisted (Pateman 1988, 
Jeffreys 2008, Manne 2018, ch 4, Srinivasan 2018).  
 
This article wades into these debates with some trepidation. It does so in the 
hope that it can build upon the existing literature in three important ways. First, 
by presenting an argument for sexual inclusion that does not limit itself to the 
concerns of particular sub-sets of people but focuses on the general problem of 
sexual exclusion and what ought to be done about it. Second, by resisting the 
temptation to slide too quickly and unjustifiably into talk about sex rights. And 
third by engaging with the major counterarguments and objections to the idea of 
sexual inclusion.  
 
The paper proceeds in three stages. In the next section, it presents an initial 
defence and explanation of what it might mean to treat sex as a distributive 
good. This is followed by an initial defence and discussion of what it might 
mean to say that there can be both positive and negative claim rights to sexual 
inclusion. Then, with these initial clarifications out of the way, the paper 
proceeds to the main task of addressing and responding to objections to its two 
theses. It address four major objections (The Misogyny Objection; The 
Impossibility Objection; The Stigmatisation Objection; and the Social 
Engineering Objection) as well as a handful of more minor objections. The 
paper concludes by arguing that the two theses remain compelling and 
significant despite the fact that there are legitimate concerns about how they 
might work in practice. 
  
2. Sexual Experience as a Distributive Good 
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The first thesis defended in this article is that sexual experience can be (and 
ought to be) treated as a distributive good, i.e. as something that people should 
be able to experience as part of a well lived life and that ought to be thought of 
in light of the principles of distributive justice. What case can be made in favour 
of this thesis? 
 
Let’s start with the general idea of distributive goods and distributive justice. 
Most people are familiar with the thought that wealth and material resources can 
be understood as distributive goods. If a society generates a social surplus of 
material wealth, then we typically accept that a decision needs to be made about 
how that social surplus ought to be distributed. There are morally better or 
worse ways of doing this. A world in which all the material wealth flows to one 
individual would obviously be unjust (unless there is only one person in the 
world) whereas a world in which all wealth was shared equally would probably 
be just (though we need to be careful since this may require unjust transfers of 
wealth and may compromise other aspects of social well-being). In between 
those two extremes, there is plenty of room for reasonable disagreement about 
how to distribute material wealth in the fairest and most just way. Some people 
are avowed minimal statists, resistant to most wealth transfers; some people are 
radical egalitarians, insisting on significant transfers from the wealthy to the 
poor; some people are prioritarians or luck egalitarians, insisting that some 
people deserve transfers and others don’t and that there should be a priority 
ranking when it comes to accessing the social surplus. The debate is complex 
and this is worth bearing in mind when it comes to thinking about sexual 
experience as a distributive good.  
 
But why think of sexual experience as a distributive good? There are two 
points to make in response to that question. The first point is that, although 
material wealth might be the natural home for distributive thinking, there are 
 5 
other things, including experiences and opportunities, that can appropriately 
feature among the distributive goods that are part of our theory of distributive 
justice. Various goods like education, health, and the enjoyment of cultural 
products are, for example, already widely discussed in these terms. Another 
example, which provides an illustrative analogy for present purposes, is 
meaningful work. Paid employment is a source of income. If people lose their 
jobs, we often immediately think about the need to compensate them for the loss 
of income this entails. This is natural distributive justice thinking. But work is a 
source of other goods too. It is a source of meaning, purpose and social status. 
Recently, several authors have argued that we need to think about these non-
income-related goods in distributive terms as well (Gheaus and Herzog 2016; 
Timmerman 2017; Bowie 2018). For example, Cristian Timmerman has argued 
that the good of meaningful work is currently unfairly distributed and that this 
ought to be corrected. In making this argument, Timmerman focuses 
specifically on the experiences that are part and parcel of being employed, and 
not just the material benefits it brings. The reason why people think about 
experiences like meaningful work, the enjoyment of health and well-being, and 
the enjoyment of culture in distributive terms is straightforward. These 
experiences are integral to the good life. They are part of what it means to live a 
rich and flourishing life. 
 
This leads to the second point. The obvious reason to treat sexual experience 
as a distributive good is that it too is part of what it takes to live a rich and 
flourishing life. Sexual experiences (if done right) are intrinsically pleasurable 
and enjoyable; they also have great personal and cultural significance. Having a 
sex life is usually taken to be part of what it takes to be a mature member of 
society. So much so that some people don’t feel themselves to be fully human in 
its absence (de Boer 2014 & 2015). It would, consequently, not be too much of 
a stretch to say that having a sex life is part of what it takes to live a meaningful 
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and purposeful life, and so should be included in the package of ‘goods’ that 
make up our theory of distributive justice. Of course, this thought should not be 
pushed too far. Some people can choose to be celibate for religious reasons, 
others find that they have low sex drives and are contentedly asexual by nature. 
These people can live perfectly happy and fulfilling lives. For many, however, 
the absence of sex is a struggle and, at a minimum, it seems reasonable to 
suggest that everyone should be given the opportunity to have a sex life. 
 
These thoughts are not original. Tracy de Boer, for example, has argued we 
should think about the importance of sexual experience in light of Martha 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen’s ‘capabilities’ approach to justice (De Boer 2014, 
ch. 2; Nussbaum 2011 and Sen 1999). The essence of this approach is that 
justice should not be seen exclusively in terms of material wealth and resources 
but, instead, in terms of opportunities to live a flourishing life. De Boer argues, 
reasonably enough, that having access to a sex life is core to what many people 
see as a flourishing life and so sexual opportunity should be part of the 
capabilities approach to justice (De Boer 2014, 33-34). Likewise, Di Nucci has 
argued that even if sex is not necessary to well-being it is at least a very 
important element of well-being for many people such that its ‘nonvoluntary 
absence from someone’s life would be morally relevant’ (Di Nucci 2017, 75). 
 
These will be obvious claims to some readers, but this then prompts the 
question: Why is it that meaningful sexual experience and access to a 
meaningful sex life have not featured widely in debates about distributive 
justice to date?3 Indeed why is it that the thought that they ever could has been 
treated with great suspicion? This article opened with Rebecca Solnit’s claim 
                                                                    
3 One notable exception to this is the utopianist plan of Charles Fourier which proposed a guaranteed sexual 
minimum — somewhat akin to a guaranteed basic income. Fourier’s proposal is, of course, deeply problematic 
given the authoritarianism and coercion it would seem to entail. A rich amorous nobility, according to Fourier, 
would be required to service the sexual needs of the masses. On this, see Srinivasan 2018. 
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that sex is not like a sandwich. The intention behind this claim was to argue that 
sex should not be thought of as something that can be divided up and 
redistributed from the sexually enriched to the sexually impoverished (Solnit 
2015). The merits of this criticism will be dealt with later on, but now simply 
note that some of this suspicion might derive from what we take the good of 
sexual experience to be. If we can clarify what it is that we are trying to 
distribute more fairly, we can see whether or not it is absurd to think about its 
distribution in terms of the principles of distributive justice. 
 
In this respect, it is important that we are not too narrow or traditional in our 
definition of meaningful ‘sexual experience’. If you assume that what it takes to 
have a meaningful sex life is to regularly engage in penile-vaginal intercourse 
then, of course, the notion that sexual experience is a distributive good that 
ought to be thought of in light of principles of distributive justice will seem 
absurd. Not only that, it will be obviously wrong since it excludes meaningful 
homosexual sexual experiences from its calculus. Penile-vaginal intercourse is 
one form of meaningful sexual experience, but not the only form. We need to go 
beyond the bounds of tradition to generate a plausible conception of sexual 
justice.  
 
When we do this the concept of meaningful sexual experience becomes 
necessarily tricky to define. But we can embrace this fuzziness. In doing so, we 
can acknowledge that different sexual experiences can be meaningful to 
different people, depending on both the nature of their sexual preferences, and 
the nature of their sexual inclusion/exclusion. Any reasonable theory of sexual 
justice must take heed of this pluralism. At a minimum, sexual experience 
would require some degree of sexual arousal and pleasure (up to and including 
orgasm), but since people can get their kicks in different ways it is hard to be 
more precise than that. It is plausible to assume that for many people sexual 
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experiences are most meaningful when they involve a sexual partner (or 
partners), but ensuring that everyone has access to a sexual partner is certainly 
not required by a reasonable theory of sexual justice. Enabling people to access 
pleasurable forms of masturbation, for example, could be very beneficial and 
meaningful to them if they have been prevented from access this themselves. 
Similarly, having access to various sex technologies, including sex robots (Di 
Nucci 2017), could be part of our conception of meaningful sexual experience. 
Broadening our conception of sexual experience in this manner makes thinking 
about it in distributive terms more reasonable. 
 
Two important caveats should be borne in mind when adopting this 
pluralistic approach to meaningful sexual experience. First, the good of sexual 
experience often gets entangled with other related goods, such as intimacy and a 
sense of maturity. We can live with this entanglement and, indeed, use it as part 
of the argument for thinking about sexual experience as a distributive good, 
provided we don’t conflate the good of sexual experience with these other 
goods. Sexual intimacy is but one form of intimacy — important though it may 
be — and the other forms of intimacy should not be neglected in our distributive 
calculations. Furthermore, there are other pathways to a sense of maturity that 
could be as beneficial as accessing a sex life. It is important that the sex-specific 
goods be kept front and centre in any theory of sexual justice. Second, although 
this article urges a pluralistic approach to meaningful sexual experience, it is 
essential to the view being defended that certain forms of sexual experience are 
not ‘on the table’ when it comes to applying distributive principles to the 
problem of sexual exclusion. For example, if someone has a sexual preference 
for otherwise immoral sexual experiences — e.g. nonconsensual sex or sex with 
a child — then this cannot and should not be factored into any plan to create a 
more sexually equal world. 
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Should we care about creating a more sexually equal world? To answer that 
question we need to engage with the problem that motivates this entire article: 
the problem of sexual exclusion. This problem arises from the fact that some 
people are being limited or excluded from meaningful sexual experience and so 
are living a less rich and flourishing life than others. Not all such people should 
concern us. As noted, there are presumably some people that have voluntarily 
excluded themselves from sexual experience. Their lack of a sex life does not 
suggest that something is amiss when it comes to our overall sense of how just 
our society is. Nevertheless, there are others who are unjustly sexually 
impoverished or excluded, who lack access to a meaningful sex life and who 
experience that lack acutely. These are the people that should concern us and 
should encourage us to think about the idea of creating a more sexually equal 
world. 
 
To understand why, we need to get a bit clearer about the potential 
mechanisms of sexual exclusion. Although many of these mechanisms overlap 
in individual cases, and although it is dangerous to group them into distinct 
conceptual categories, for initial purposes we can identify three main 
mechanisms of sexual exclusion: 
 
 (i) Personal, i.e. mechanisms of exclusion that stem from the properties or 
features of the person who is excluded. Examples might include a person’s 
prejudicial attitudes toward certain, otherwise available, sexual partners, a 
person’s sexual shyness or awkwardness or their excessive romantic idealism, 
and certain (but definitely not all) physical or mental disabilities that the person 
might have. 
 
(ii) Social, i.e. mechanisms of exclusion that stem from the properties or 
features of other people (other than the person who is sexually excluded) or 
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social institutions. Examples might include prejudicial attitudes toward the 
social group to whom the excluded person belongs (e.g. presumptions of 
asexuality for disabled persons; anti-trans beliefs etc), laws and social norms 
that prohibit or condemn certain sexual liaisons (e.g. laws criminalising 
homosexual and interracial sexual activity), and discriminatory ideologies. 
 
(iii) Natural, i.e. mechanisms of exclusion that result predominantly or 
exclusively from evolved instincts or drives that lead people to favour certain 
kinds of sexual partner or sexual experience over others. 
 
It needs to be reiterated, lest there be any confusion, that dividing up the 
mechanisms of exclusion in this way has the potential to mislead. It is essential 
that we don’t assume that the distinctions between them are precise or that any 
individual case of sexual exclusion is likely to fit wholly or neatly within one of 
them. On the contrary, most actual cases will involve the ‘intersection’ of 
multiple mechanisms of sexual exclusion. The categories are merely for the 
purposes of bringing some preliminary order to how we think about this topic. It 
is also worth noting, in passing, that the suggestion there is a clear category of 
‘natural’ mechanisms of sexual exclusion, that is distinct from social 
mechanisms, is rejected by some people. This is mentioned now because it is 
relevant to one of the objections (the Social Engineering Objection) discussed 
later in this paper. 
 
Are any of these mechanisms of sexual exclusion unjust? Presumably yes. If 
you are homosexual and prevented from accessing meaningful sexual 
experiences due to laws that criminalise your sexual conduct, then you are being 
unjustly excluded from meaningful sexual experience. This is an easy case. 
Other cases are trickier but it is possible to see injustice within them too. Take a 
potentially controversial example: that of an obese man. In our present day and 
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age, obesity is sometimes seen as a sexually unattractive quality; it is also 
something that can, in its extreme form, make it physically difficult to engage in 
sexual activity. Assume that this obese man is unable to find a sexual partner or 
engage in satisfactory sexual experiences. Is he being unjustly sexually 
excluded? Possibly. We know that norms of beauty and sexual attractiveness are 
variable to some degree — pleasant plumpness was historically a sexually 
attractive quality4 and norms of body size and shape do vary cross-culturally5 — 
thus it seems plausible to think that the man is a victim of unjust exclusion due 
to the, at least somewhat, contingent and arbitrary variations in social norms (cf. 
Minerva 2016 and 2017 who discusses the wider injustices perpetuated by this 
form of ‘Lookism’). As a result of this unjust exclusion, we might think it 
appropriate to do something to improve his sexual opportunities. We could do 
this by changing the prejudicial attitudes of those around him, by making it 
easier for him to link up with people who find his body shape and size sexually 
desirable or, perhaps in certain circumstances, even paying for gastric-bypass 
surgery to reduce body size. This last suggestion will be controversial so it is 
important to clarify that physical body modification is very unlikely to be the 
preferred means of resolving unjust sexual exclusion. In general, if someone has 
a body shape/property that is widely (though not absolutely) perceived as 
sexually unattractive there will be three things we can do to address their sexual 
exclusion: (i) we can do something to modify their body shape or property; (ii) 
we can match them to those who find their body shape attractive (or give them 
access to other outlets for sexual expression that are non-partnered, e.g. sex toys 
                                                                    
4 Ancient artifacts of female body types are often plump or obese by modern standards. Also the depiction 
of ideal female body types in art and fashion has changed over time. The so-called ‘Rubenesque’ beauty — 
based on the paintings of Peter Paul Rubens — does not seem to fit the ideal of beauty in the modern era. For an 
excellent analysis of changing ideals in female waist-to-hip ratio over time see Bovet and Raymond 2015. Of 
course, it is noteworthy that the example used in the text is of an obese man, not a woman, and that beauty 
standards have always been somewhat more flexible for men (at least in heterosexual communities). 
5 For a general discussion see Swami and Furnham (2007). A particularly controversial example of variation in 
cross-cultural beauty standards is that of Mauritania where ‘overfed’ women are seen as sexually desirable. For 
a description of the overfeeding practice, see Ouldzeidoune et al 2013. For an attempted explanation of why 
desired weight varies cross-culturally, see Anderson et al 1992. I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for 
drawing my attention to the Mauritania example. 
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and so on); or (iii) we can try to change societal preferences to make them more 
sexually included. In the majority of cases, strategies (ii) and (iii) are most 
likely to be the ‘just’ strategies to follow because they will not involve some 
permanent body modification nor will they compound the injustice done to an 
already marginalized/excluded population by making the problem something 
that they need to ‘fix’. That said, this does not mean that (i) is never the 
appropriate thing to do. There could be cases in which it is morally justified due 
to reasons of cost-effectiveness or triviality, consent, and the fact that other 
moral ends are satisfied in the process. So, for example, some countries already 
pay for gastric bypass surgery as part of national healthcare on grounds of 
personal health and well-being. The fact that it might also facilitate sexual 
inclusion could be part of the justification for doing this and does not, if the 
argument in this paper is correct, need to be denied or occluded from the 
discussion (though, on this point, see the discussion of the Stigmatisation 
Objection, below). 
 
Similarly, imagine the case of a heterosexual woman who rarely or never 
experiences an orgasm, either through masturbation or with a sexual partner. 
This is not an uncommon problem. Researchers find that there is an ‘orgasm 
gap’ between heterosexual men and women, with heterosexual women 
experiencing one third fewer orgasms than heterosexual men, according to one 
largescale study (Frederick et al 2018). Is this woman a victim of sexual 
injustice? Possibly. She may live in a society in which women’s sexual pleasure 
is not taken seriously and is subordinated to male sexual pleasure (a common 
concern), or she may never have been taught about how to adequately sexually 
pleasure herself. There are things we as a society could do to ensure she has 
more equal access to pleasurable sexual experiences. Indeed, people are already 
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talking about the need to close the ‘orgasm gap’ in these egalitarian terms 
(Horan 2018; MysteryVibe 2018).6  
We could go on and consider other examples involving the unjust sexual 
exclusion that arises from disability (de Boer 2014 & 2015; Shakespeare 1999) 
or transgender sexual exclusion (Sharpe 2018), but the point is made: some 
forms of sexual exclusion are unjust and unfair and there are things we could do 
to mitigate this injustice.  
 
Our perception of injustice in these cases probably depends on two major 
variables: (i) whether we think there is anything we, as a society, can do to 
rectify the problem of exclusion (without causing significant damage to other 
moral values/rights and at a reasonable cost) and (ii) to what extent we blame 
the individual for their own plight. If we think there is something we can do, 
and we don’t blame the individual for their sexual exclusion, we are more likely 
to perceive an injustice. When the opposite is true, we are more likely to shrug 
our shoulders and tell people to help themselves. It’s possible that neither of 
these variables should influence our perceptions of injustice, but for the 
purposes of this article we can remain neutral on this matter. 
 
In sum, the preceding discussion should suffice for a prima facie argument in 
favour of thinking about meaningful sexual experience as a distributive good. 
Some people are impoverished and excluded from this good, and some of them 
are excluded and impoverished for unjust or unfair reasons. What’s more, 
people are already thinking about these cases of in light of the ideals of 
distributive justice. They are just not doing so systematically and explicitly. 
They are focusing on particular cases of exclusion and not on the general 
phenomenon. This article urges us to take the more general perspective and 
                                                                    
6 Also, for example, see https://www.salon.com/2018/06/02/the-orgasm-gap-picking-up-where-the-sexual-
revolution-left-off_partner/ 
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focus on sexual exclusion per se as a key issue (Liberman 2018). It also urges 
us to think about this first and foremost in terms of distributive justice — i.e. as 
something to be addressed through principles and ideals of equality — and not 
primarily as a rights-related issue.  
 
Still, we have to spend some time considering the idea of sex rights since it 
features so prominently in the debate about sexual inclusion and exclusion (e.g. 
De Boer 2014 & 2015; Appel 2010, Di Nucci 2011, Thomsen 2015, Liberman 
2018, Srinivasan 2018). That’s what we do in the next section. 
 
 
3. A Right to Sexual Inclusion 
Recognising sexual experience as a distributive good does not entail or 
require us to recognise the existence of sex rights.7 It is possible to recognise 
that something is integral to a well-lived human life without necessarily 
endorsing the idea that each and every individual has a right to some fair share 
of it. For example, many societies recognise that money and property are 
important distributive goods without at the same time recognising an individual 
right to a specific share of money or property. Ensuring a fair share of those 
goods is seen as an aspirational social goal, not a juridical right. Still, it is 
important not to be disingenuous in making this point. Recognising something 
as a distributive good does provide moral grounds for recognising potential 
rights to a fair share of that good. This is because individuals have a moral 
interest or stake in distributive goods and this is commonly taken to provide a 
normative grounding for rights. So in recognising sexual experience as a 
                                                                    
7 It should be clear from this sentence that I am not relying on a ‘natural’ or ‘moral’ theory of rights in this 
paper. I’m focused on legally recognised and operational rights. I assume there is a connection between ideal 
morality and the recognition of a right, but that there is also some ‘gap’ between what might be morally ideal 
and what is legally wise. 
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distributive good we do start down a path that leads, quite naturally, to talk of 
sex rights.  
 
Before we go too far down that path, however, we need to emphasise that 
certain kinds of sex rights should never be entertained. For example, a right for 
one person to have sex with a specifically identified other person, without any 
care for that other person’s rights and entitlements, would be morally abhorrent. 
It would not, unfortunately, be historically unprecedented — in many countries, 
until quite recently, husbands effectively had a (negative) right to coerced 
intercourse with their wives due to the so-called ‘marital rape’ exemption — but 
we should not return to such a world, nor should we think that recognising 
sexual experience as a distributive good requires such a return. Before 
recognising a right to anything in particular you need to consider the different 
moral interests, costs and benefits at stake, and weigh them appropriately. This 
may speak against the recognition of a right, even if there is a morally 
legitimate interest at stake. 
 
Taking this onboard, the remainder of this section defends the view that 
recognising some kind of right to sexual inclusion is not necessarily an 
implausible or absurd consequence of viewing sexual experience as a 
distributive good. Or, to express the same thought more positively, it is argued 
that there are some compelling moral reasons to favour recognising a bundle of 
both positive and negative claim rights to sexual inclusion.  
 
There is much room for confusion or misunderstanding here so it is 
important to clarify exactly what is being said. Let’s start by clarifying the 
nature of rights. The word ‘right’ is multiply ambiguous. As noted long ago by 
Wesley Hohfeld (1919), when people refer to the idea of a ‘right to x’ they often 
conflate and confuse distinct moral claims and powers. In his more recent 
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updating of Hohfeld’s analysis, Leif Wenar (2005; 2012) argues that rights 
break-down into four distinct ‘incidents’ or ‘molecular’ components: (i) the 
privilege, i.e. the freedom to do as you please within a certain zone of privacy; 
(ii) the claim, i.e. the duty imposed on others to do or forebear from doing 
something to you; (iii) the power, i.e. the legal entitlement to waive your rights; 
and (iv) the immunity, i.e. the legal protection against others trying to waive 
your rights on your behalf. These four incidents are conceptually and logically 
related. Recognising that someone has a privilege to do X usually entails a 
corresponding claim-right against others to recognise that privilege and not to 
interfere with the exercise of it. Still, it is possible for the different incidents to 
pull apart and not be recognised conjointly. Most alleged ‘rights’ are not any 
one thing but rather bundles of these different incidents. 
 
So what kind of a right might a right to sexual inclusion be? The most 
obvious classification would be as a claim-right, i.e. as a claim that a sexually 
excluded person can make against others to do or forebear from doing 
something that will ensure their greater sexual inclusion. It could also, in some 
cases, be a privilege, i.e. a freedom to engage in certain kinds of sexual activity 
without interference – though it should be remembered that any such freedom 
would have to be balanced against the rights and freedoms of others, and would 
have to factor in other moral costs. For the most part, we will ignore the idea of 
privileges in what follows and focus on claim-rights to sexual inclusion. 
 
Note how the plural form (‘claim-rights’) was used in the previous sentence. 
This is because the right to sexual inclusion should not be understood as a single 
type of claim that one person can make against another. Rather, it should be 
understood as a bundle of different moral claims that a sexually excluded person 
might be entitled to make. An analogous example would be the ‘right to a fair 
trial’. This right is not any one specific thing but, rather, a bundle of different 
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rights that an accused person has, including the right to legal counsel, the right 
to confront one’s accusers, the right to an impartial tribunal, the right to silence, 
the presumption of innocence, the right to a jury of one’s peers, and so on. 
Some elements of this bundle of rights are more important than others, and 
some are downplayed and ignored in some jurisdictions; nevertheless, they all 
go into the general idea of a right to a fair trial. The right to sexual inclusion 
will be broadly similar, consisting in a bundle of more and less important claim-
rights. 
 
 In viewing the right to sexual inclusion as a bundle of claim rights, we need 
to introduce another important conceptual distinction. This is the distinction 
between positive claim-rights and negative claim-rights. This distinction was 
flagged in the earlier definition of a claim-right but it is important to spell it out. 
A positive claim-right is a duty that one person can impose on another to do 
something on his or her behalf. For example, a positive claim-right to housing 
or education might impose a duty on a government to provide an individual 
with housing or education. A negative claim-right is a duty that one person can 
impose on another to refrain from interfering with his or her exercise of a 
privilege. For example, a negative claim-right to private property would impose 
a duty on others not to trespass or interfere with that property. The bundle of 
claim rights to sexual inclusion could feature either type. 
 
This is enough by way of clarification. Why should we accept the idea that 
there is such a bundle of claim rights? There are two reasons: (i) recognising at 
least some claim-rights to sexual inclusion is morally justified and (ii) doing so 
does not entail any significant moral (or other) costs. In other words, 
recognising such rights would be the humane and decent thing to do, in light of 
the importance of meaningful sexual experience to the well-lived life, and in 
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response to the fact that some people are unjustly excluded from that kind of 
experience.  
 
The best way to argue for this is by considering specific examples. We can 
start by looking at negative claim-rights to sexual inclusion. Many negative 
claim-rights to sexual inclusion are plausible because recognising them entails 
no significant moral costs. All it usually requires is removing legal restrictions 
on certain kinds of sexual activity. This then unlocks meaningful sexual 
experience for large cohorts of people. One could argue that many of the 
historical struggles for sexual justice have taken this form. For example, 
removing criminal and other legal bans on homosexuality and interracial 
relationships is both an explicit and implicit recognition of a negative claim-
right to sexual inclusion.  
 
That said, not all negative claim-rights to sexual inclusion are going to be 
uncontroversial. In the literature on disability and sex rights, there is an active 
and ongoing debate about removing legal restrictions on prostitution and sexual 
surrogacy in order to enable certain disabled people to access meaningful 
sexual experience (De Boer 2015; Appel 2010; Di Nucci 2011; Thomsen 2015; 
Liberman 2018). Those who favour removing such restrictions do so on the 
grounds that they are an impediment to sexual inclusion. The counterargument 
is that legalising prostitution and sexual surrogacy is not morally costless. There 
are problems with both forms of work that could be exacerbated through 
legalisation. A similarly controversial debate arises in relation to negative claim 
rights to the sexual inclusion of transgender persons. In some countries it is 
effectively a criminal offence for a transgender person to have sex with 
someone without disclosing their gender history. Some scholars see this as an 
unjust form of sexual exclusion (Sharpe 2018). The counterargument to this is 
that the failure to disclose gender history infringes on the negative sex rights of 
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other people to consensually choose their sexual partners. No judgment is 
passed on either of these controversies in this article but note that they are 
being, and can be, debated in a way that vindicates the general plausibility of 
negative claim-rights to sexual inclusion: proponents of greater sexual inclusion 
are identifying what they perceive to be unjust impediments to inclusion, and 
opponents are highlighting the moral costs of removing those impediments. 
 
Now let’s consider positive claim-rights to sexual inclusion. Again, it seems 
obvious that many such rights will be plausible. For example, a positive right to 
sex education, including education about different mechanisms of female and 
male sexual pleasure, would be one way to ensure greater sexual inclusion (e.g. 
to close the heterosexual orgasm gap), and would seem to be relatively morally 
costless (though, of course, socially conservative groups may disagree). 
Similarly, a positive right to the provision of sex aids and sex toys might also be 
a way to foster greater sexual inclusion, particularly for those who otherwise 
lack the resources to obtain them. A positive claim-right to anti-discriminatory 
education and training could also be a way to address sexual inclusion, in a 
manner not that dissimilar to the existing rights provided under anti-
discrimination law. For example, Tracy de Boer has argued that one of the 
biggest impediments to sexual inclusion for disabled persons is the tendency for 
people to view them as asexual and not take their sexual needs seriously (De 
Boer 2014 and 2015). Educating people, particularly carers and health 
professionals, about those needs would be a relatively costless way to address 
sexual exclusion. 
 
Again, not all positive claim-rights to sexual inclusion will be 
uncontroversial. It bears repeating that a positive claim-right to sexual 
intercourse with another person would be morally abhorrent and should not be 
countenanced. But nothing in the case for a right to sexual inclusion requires 
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that we endorse that idea. Still, other less blatantly problematic, positive claim 
rights could have hidden or subtle costs that might make their recognition less 
normatively compelling. For example, it might be too difficult or economically 
costly to provide certain forms of sex aid or sex education, and some people 
might see the latter as a kind of unwarranted ‘brainwashing’. Some of these 
concerns will be considered below, but their potential existence should not 
discourage us from taking seriously the idea that there could be at least some 
rights to sexual inclusion. Indeed, the recognition of at least some such rights 
seems to be, prima facie, plausible and morally compelling.  
 
The only thing that might disrupt this conclusion (and the previous one about 
recognising sexual experience as a distributive good) is the existence 
compelling objections to the entire idea of taking seriously the problem of 
sexual exclusion. Let’s now consider a series of such objections and determine 
whether they are, in fact, compelling. 
 
 
4. The Misogyny Objection 
Let’s start with the ‘Misogyny Objection’. This objection is rooted in 
feminist writings about male-female sexual relations. Carole Pateman (1988), in 
her book The Sexual Contract, spoke out about the idea of the male ‘sex right’ 
which she saw as something that was inherent to patriarchal gender relations. 
Her idea was that under conditions of patriarchy men can have or perceive 
themselves to have a de facto claim-right to the sexual use of a woman’s body. 
This is something that can be reinforced by the existence of actual juridical 
rights too, such as the aforementioned exemption from marital rape. Sheila 
Jeffreys has used this idea to explicitly critique the discussion of disability 
rights and sexual exclusion (Jeffreys 2008; de Boer 2015). The worry seems to 
be that discussions of ‘unjust’ or ‘unfair’ sexual exclusion tend to prop up and 
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reinforce patriarchal gender relations and that women will tend to be unfairly 
treated under any system of ‘sex rights’. 
 
The glib response to this concern is to say that nothing in the preceding 
discussion of sexual exclusion and inclusion favours or reinforces the idea of 
male claim-rights to the sexual use of female bodies. Quite the contrary. The 
analysis in the previous section was at pains to dismiss this as something that is 
morally abhorrent. Furthermore, the discussion to this point has been gender 
neutral: it assumes that both men and women (and non-binary persons) can be 
victims of unjust sexual exclusion. Hence there is nothing in the prima facie 
case for a right to sexual inclusion that suggests that men will be greater 
beneficiaries of it at the expense of women. 
 
But this is a glib response because it doesn’t take onboard a more nuanced 
understanding of misogyny and patriarchy, nor does it consider how discussion 
of the injustice of sexual exclusion and a right to sexual inclusion could help to 
reinforce this. To develop a more nuanced understanding of the problem, we 
can turn to Kate Manne’s analysis of misogyny from her 2018 book Down Girl. 
In this book, Manne develops a careful, ‘ameliorative’ analysis of misogyny and 
how it relates to patriarchy and sexism. She dismisses what she calls the ‘naive’ 
view of misogyny as a form of psychological and individualised hatred towards 
woman (Manne 2018, chapter 1), and favours a more contextual and socialised 
understanding of the phenomenon (Mann 2018, chapter 2). In rough outline, 
Manne argues that patriarchy is the set of social institutions (norms, laws, 
beliefs and practices) that tends to favour male dominance and female 
subordination; that sexism is the ideology that undergirds those institutions 
(Manne 2018, chapter 3); and that misogyny is the set of practices that enforce 
the norms of patriarchy by keeping women ‘down’ (Manne 2018, chapter 2). 
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Although Manne believes that misogyny can take different localised forms 
(depending on the society and history in question), she argues that a core 
substantive part of misogyny is its role in enforcing and policing female giving 
and male taking. She argues that, under conditions of patriarchy, women are 
expected to perform certain moral support roles for men: they are expected to 
give men things like care, admiration, attention and, crucially for present 
purposes, sex (Manne 2018, 130). Men assume or demand that women do these 
things for them and shame, ridicule, question, undermine, gaslight and, 
ultimately, punish women who violate those expectations. Crucially, however, 
Manne argues that misogyny doesn’t always manifest itself in violence and 
coercion. Indeed, because the goal is to prop up a system in which women 
perform support roles for men, the preference is often for ‘soft power’ 
mechanisms of enforcement. Women are rewarded for performing the support 
roles and encouraged to see themselves as givers of care, sex, admiration and 
attention. This is seen as core to their ‘femininity’. It is only if they step out of 
line that more coercive methods of enforcement are used. 
 
Manne gives many real life examples of how misogyny, so defined, 
manifests itself. Two of them are particularly relevant for present purposes 
because they involve expectations around female sexual giving. The first 
example is Elliot Rodger (Manne 2018, ch 1 & 4). Elliot was a member of the 
online ‘incel’ community.8 In May of 2014 he killed six people and injured 
fourteen others in a rampage shooting in Santa Barbara, California. According 
to his online manifesto/memoir and a video that he published shortly before the 
killings, he did this because he felt sexually excluded and humiliated by certain 
kinds of women (he tried, but failed, to kill members of a sorority at UCSB). He 
                                                                    
8 ‘Incel’ is short for ‘involuntary celibate’. That said, the identity label has a much richer set of connotations. 
Members of the incel community often define themselves in opposition to feminist ideals and in favour of a 
certain understanding of masculinity. For a longer analysis of the incel community and its associated beliefs, see 
Ging 2019. 
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specifically said that he felt “cast out and rejected, forced to endure an existence 
of loneliness and insignificance, all because the females of the human species 
were incapable of seeing value in me” (Srinivasan 2018).  
 
The second example is Rush Limbaugh and the comments he made about 
Sandra Fluke — a young law student who argued before the US congress that 
birth control should be covered by health insurance for women at religious 
institutions. Limbaugh was incensed at the idea that taxpayers should fund 
Sandra Fluke’s sex life. If this was going to happen, he argued that there should 
be something in it for him (and the other taxpayers), namely access to amateur 
pornographic videos of Sandra Fluke having sex: 
 
“…if we are going to have a part in this, then we want something in return, 
Ms Fluke: And that would be the videos of all this sex posted online so we can 
see what we are getting for our money.”  
 
(Limbaugh, quoted in Manne 2018, 57) 
 
As Manne notes, both men exude significant amounts of sexual entitlement 
(Manne 106-107). They assume that women ought to be servicing their sexual 
needs, or, in the case of Limbaugh, giving them some sexual quid pro quo.  
 
Manne’s analysis of misogyny gives us what we need to construct a more 
nuanced version of the Misogyny Objection. This more nuanced version holds 
that any talk of sexual exclusion and of rights to sexual inclusion — even if it 
explicitly disavows the idea of a male claim-right to the sexual use of a woman 
— will still take place in a patriarchal social order in which women are expected 
to be sexually giving towards men. It will layer itself on top of this patriarchal 
order and be interpreted and practiced in its shadow. Misogynistic norm 
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enforcement will then get to work and create mechanisms — not necessarily 
punitive — that support the expectation of female sexual giving. In this manner, 
the idea of the male sex right will find an implicit lease of life. This is one thing 
that greatly worries Amia Srinivasan (2018) in her discussion of sex rights and 
sexual exclusion. Although Srinivasan is sensitive to the plight of some people 
who are sexually excluded, and thinks we may need to bring greater political 
and ethical scrutiny to the discriminatory nature of our sexual preferences, she 
worries that doing so will provide the cloak for sexual entitlement and claim 
rights to the bodies of others: 
 
“there is a risk too that repoliticising desire will encourage a discourse of 
sexual entitlement. Talk of people who are unjustly sexually marginalised or 
excluded can pave the way to the thought that these people have a right to sex, a 
right that is being violated by those who refuse to have sex with them.”  
 
(Srinivasan 2018) 
 
This is one reason why Srinivasan thinks it is best not to think of sexual 
experience as distributive good, but rather as something that is sui generis and 
totally different from anything else we value and share.  
 
This is certainly a more persuasive and subtle way to run the Misogyny 
Objection, but is it any good? The objection should be taken seriously, but it 
does not suffice to undermine the idea of treating sexual experience as a 
distributive good, nor the plausibility of some rights to sexual inclusion. What 
the Misogyny Objection shows is that the project of ensuring greater sexual 
inclusion is fraught with risk and that, if done wrongly, could serve to reinforce 
a discriminatory and oppressive social regime. But in and of itself this is not 
enough to scupper the project. Most moral projects and revolutions are fraught 
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with risk. They can clash with or exaggerate the worst features of the old 
regime. The project of ensuring greater racial equality, for example, has 
historically had to layer itself on top of social norms, beliefs and practices that 
were inherently racist. This has had some unwelcome manifestations (e.g. the 
Jim Crow system in the southern US), but this did not mean that the project 
itself should have been abandoned. It just meant that more work needed to be 
done (and still needs to be done) to overcome the legacy of racism.  
 
The same is likely to be true when it comes to sexual inclusion. If there is a 
genuine injustice in sexual exclusion, then it is important that we address that 
injustice even if doing so is fraught with risk. In this respect it is important to 
remember that there are different types of sexual exclusion, not all of which are 
unjust, and that sexual exclusion often overlaps and intersects with other forms 
of discrimination and social exclusion. Some people face far more profound and 
systematic forms of sexual exclusion than others. As noted already, some 
disabled people find that their sexuality is completely denied or ignored (de 
Boer 2014 & 2015). They aren’t just excluded from pleasurable or desirable 
forms of sex; they are excluded from all forms of sex. This compounds and 
reinforces the other kinds of discrimination that they face. Likewise, 
heterosexual women are often themselves victims of systematic and repeated 
sexual exclusion: their sexual pleasure is often not taken seriously, as is 
evidenced by the existence of the orgasm gap, and any project of sexual 
inclusion should be focused on them just as much, if not more so, than anyone 
else. 
 
The answer to the Misogyny Objection, therefore, is not to deny the injustice 
of sexual exclusion, but rather to build in significant anti-misogyny safeguards 
to how the project of sexual inclusion is pursued. Although this is something 
that will require greater development, there would appear to be four key 
 26 
elements to those anti-misogyny safeguards. First, the commitment to a strong 
zone of negative sexual autonomy should be reiterated and emphasised at every 
opportunity. No one should feel obligated to sexual activity against their will. 
The right to refuse sexual interactions should take pride of place in any schema 
of sex rights. Second, priority could be given to addressing certain forms of 
sexual exclusion over others. In particular, priority could be given to those who 
experience more profound and systematic forms of sexual exclusion, and who 
find that their sexual exclusion intersects with other forms of discrimination and 
exclusion. By granting such priority, we can better guarantee that the project of 
sexual inclusion supports and reinforces other social justice and equality 
projects. Third, we need to recognise and emphasise that some forms of sexual 
exclusion are not unjust; they are the product of immoral minds and/or immoral 
social norms. In this regard, the sexual exclusion experienced by someone like 
Elliot Rodger is not something that should be recognised by a theory of sexual 
injustice. It is the result of misguided, sexist, though sadly not uncommon, 
beliefs about what a ‘real’ man should expect and desire in the way of a sexual 
partner (Ging 2019). We do not have to legitimise or validate those sexual 
preferences (just as we don’t have to legitimise or validate the sexual 
preferences of the rape fantasist or paedophile). Finally, and in light of this, we 
should recognise that misogynistic beliefs and practices are themselves often the 
cause of sexual exclusion, both for men, who demand and expect unrealistic 
forms of sex, and for women, whose sexual needs and desires are ignored. Thus, 
dismantling and reforming misogynistic beliefs and practices can be seen as part 
and parcel of the project of fostering more sexual inclusion. They need not be in 
tension with one another 
 
5. The Impossibility/Impracticality Objection 
The second major objection is the Impossibility Objection (or, less severely, 
the Impracticality Objection). According to this objection, the project of 
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fostering a more just distribution of sexual experience is doomed to fail because 
it is morally or practically impossible to realise. There are different ways of 
running this objection. Some focus on what seems to be a genuine practical or 
maybe even conceptual impossibility in the idea of sexual inclusion; others 
focus on the ineffectuality or resource costs that might be involved. 
 
An example of what might be a serious moral or practical impossibility can 
be found in the work of Ezio di Nucci and his ‘puzzle’ about sex rights (2011). 
Di Nucci’s puzzle arises from thinking about rights to partnered sex. He argues 
that there is a tension between the recognition of positive and negative rights to 
partnered sex. As he puts it:  
 
“Universal positive sexual rights are incompatible with universal negative 
sexual rights. If A has a positive sexual right, then that means that there is at 
least one person who would lack negative sexual rights. Namely: the person 
who would be supposed to fulfill A’s positive sexual rights.” (Di Nucci 2011, 
159)9  
 
Di Nucci is surely correct in suggesting that there is significant tension 
between positive and negative claim rights to partnered sex. But since the 
incompatibility only applies to partnered sex, it does not undermine the 
argument being made in this article: this article has already been at pains to 
argue that we should not recognise a positive claim right to partnered sex. 
Furthermore, Di Nucci himself thinks it would be ‘bad’ if we concluded, from 
his formulation of the puzzle, that there are no positive sex rights (Di Nucci 
2017, 73). Still, his puzzle does prompt a broader inquiry into whether there 
might frequently be tensions between positive claim rights to sexual inclusion 
                                                                    
9 Strictly speaking, positive and negative sex rights are not metaphysically incompatible. It is possible to 
imagine a world in which everyone’s positive desire for sex with another is not contradicted by anyone’s 
negative desire to avoid sex with another. It’s just highly implausible that we live in such a world. 
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and other negative rights. For example, could it be that one person’s claim right 
to be recognised as a sexual being is in tension with another person’s right to 
freedom of thought?  
 
This is superficially plausible, but the mere fact that there might be some 
tension between a positive right to sexual inclusion and some other negative 
claim right is not a reason to deny the existence of the positive claim right. 
Positive and negative rights often come into conflict and the conflict isn’t 
always resolved in favour of the negative right. For example, my negative claim 
right to my own property need not take precedence over your positive claim 
right to retreat to my property to protect yourself from violent attack; my 
negative right to do as I please with my time might not take precedence over 
your positive right to demand that I give evidence at your trial.  
 
What matters really are the moral interests and costs at stake. If it would be 
worse, all things considered, to favour a negative right over a positive right, 
then we may wish to recognise the positive right to the detriment of the negative 
right. This could be true in the case of rights to sexual inclusion. As noted 
earlier in this article, some positive rights to sexual inclusion are relatively low 
cost (in terms of the moral stakes at play). They focus on the right to 
enlightened sex education, the right to have one’s sexuality recognised and the 
right to technological sex aids and birth control. While recognising such rights 
may involve the violation of someone’s negative rights, the violation would be 
relatively minor and costless. Di Nucci recognises this himself by arguing that 
the provision of sex robots would be one, less morally costly way, to recognise 
positive sex rights (Di Nucci 2017). Furthermore, in response to criticisms from 
Steven Firth (2019), Di Nucci (2019) has clarified that his original formulation 
of the incompatibility did not imply that positive sex rights were completely 
impossible. On the contrary, his view is that we should be open to the idea that 
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there are positive sex rights, provided that they do not interfere with anyone’s 
negative rights to sexual self-determination. This would seem to imply that a 
positive sex right can interfere with other kinds of negative rights (e.g. such as 
the right to property and so on). 
 
There are other ways to run the objection. These do not focus on moral or 
physical impossibilities but rather on how difficult or ineffectual the recognition 
of rights to sexual inclusion would be in practice. For example, we might doubt 
whether enlightened sex education could actually do much to change people’s 
sexual attitudes and behaviours. Or we might worry that the provision of sex 
aids to people who are sexually excluded is insulting and only gives them 
access to a less meaningful or desirable form of sexual experience. Or we might 
worry that providing such education and services comes with a significant 
opportunity cost. A critic could point out that there are more pressing issues of 
distributive justice that need our time and attention. The problem of sexual 
exclusion is too difficult to solve and not worth the time and energy. 
 
None of these concerns is sufficient to scupper the project of fostering 
greater sexual inclusion. Part of the argument made in this paper is that we 
currently underestimate and underappreciate the problem of sexual exclusion. 
This is because of an inconsistency in our moral beliefs. Most of us recognise 
that meaningful sexual experience is part of the good life, but we don’t think 
seriously about the systematic and enduring exclusion of certain groups of 
people from meaningful sexual experience. We don’t appreciate that there are 
simple things we can do to help these people. These things may seem trivial or 
ineffectual from the perspective of someone who doesn’t experience this form 
of exclusion, but they may be quite significant from the perspective of someone 
who does. Furthermore, as suggested above, we shouldn’t think about social 
justice projects as zero-sum games. Resolving the problem of sexual exclusion 
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need not come at the expense of other kinds of distributive social justice. Since 
sexual exclusion often overlaps with and intersects with other forms of 
discrimination and inequality, addressing it can help to reinforce and compound 
our other efforts to create a more just society. Finally, we need to bear in mind 
the old saying that we shouldn’t make the perfect the enemy of the good. Just 
because recognising certain positive rights to sexual inclusion may seem 
tantamount to recognising inferior or less meaningful form of sexual experience 
does not mean that recognising them brings no net benefit. This is true for other 
forms of distributive justice too. Giving someone a welfare payment of €200 a 
week is better than giving them nothing, even if it doesn’t make them a 
millionaire. Why should we take a different attitude toward the distribution of 
meaningful sexual experience? 
 
 
6. The Stigmatisation Objection 
The third objection is the Stigmatisation Objection. This objection holds that 
trying to foster sexual inclusion is deeply problematic because it risks 
stigmatising and exacerbating the social exclusion experienced by certain 
groups of people. The clearest exponent of this objection is probably Alida 
Liberman (2018). She focuses specifically on how the problem manifests in the 
debate about disability and sexual exclusion. Liberman argues that focusing on 
the sexual exclusion of disabled persons is misleading and problematic because 
being disabled is neither necessary nor sufficient for being sexually excluded 
(Liberman 2018, 255).  She argues that the term ‘disability’ is vague and covers 
many different people with many different conditions. Some of them may 
experience sexual exclusion, but many others will not. Furthermore, many 
people who do not have disabilities will experience sexually exclusion so that 
focusing solely on the sexual exclusion of persons with disabilities will obscure 
or distract from the wider problem. As Liberman puts it: 
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“Focusing on disability status as a proxy for sexual exclusion both 
perpetuates negative stereotypes about disability, and is a less fruitful approach 
than getting to the core of the issue by focusing on sexual exclusion directly.”  
 
(Liberman 2018, 256) 
 
Although Liberman does not develop this point, it seems obvious that her 
concern transfers over others group of people one might like to focus on 
because of their sexual exclusion. This includes other groups discussed in this 
article, such as heterosexual women, obese persons, transgender persons, geeky 
introverted men and so on. If you make a special issue of their sexual exclusion 
you risk stigmatising and perpetuating negative stereotypes, particularly 
negative sexual stereotypes, about an entire group of people.  
 
Two things can be said in response to this objection. First, note that 
Liberman herself thinks that the solution to the problem is to focus on sexual 
exclusion per se and not on other proxy variables that might happen to correlate 
with sexual exclusion. That’s exactly the case that this article is putting forward: 
that we should make an issue out of sexual exclusion itself and shouldn’t 
assume that it is a problem faced by only one cohort of people. We should 
appreciate its pervasiveness and seriousness beyond particular niches or subsets 
of humanity. So this article is, in part, trying to make the corrective move that 
Liberman recommends.11  
 
But this might seem a little disingenuous. After all, the way in which sexual 
exclusion overlaps and intersects with other kinds of discrimination and social 
                                                                    
11 It should be noted that Liberman herself is somewhat circumspect about the problem of sexual exclusion. She 
isn’t sure how seriously it should be taken or what should be done in response to it (Liberman 2018, 256). 
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exclusion has been emphasised throughout. And it was argued that people who 
experience unjust sexual exclusion in addition to other forms of unjust social 
exclusion should be given some priority in any scheme of distributive sexual 
justice. If this position is followed in practice it would seem to entail the 
stigmatisation and ‘othering’ that concerns Liberman, perhaps in a more 
balkanised and extensive form. 
 
This is where the second response to the Stigmatisation Objection comes in. 
It may be that singling out particular groups is, unfortunately, an inevitable but 
necessary consequence of any approach to distributive justice that tries to be 
sensitive to intersecting dimensions of exclusion and discrimination. If you are 
sexually excluded and disabled and transgender, then you may well experience 
a unique compounding set of unjust exclusions. It is not clear why we shouldn’t 
want be sensitive to that unique set of experiences in our approach to 
distributive justice. And it’s not clear why it wouldn’t be appropriate to 
prioritise or pay special attention to your kind of case. We do this in other 
distributive contexts already. For example, when it comes to educational 
opportunities and scholarships, there doesn’t seem to be anything untoward 
about setting up a scheme that gives priority to working class women from 
racial minorities. Indeed, you might even argue that a scheme that ignored those 
interlocking dimensions of identity would be less just than one that did not. If 
one of the forms of injustice experienced by, say, trans people is their sexual 
exclusion (in addition to other forms of injustice) ignoring that and lumping 
their experiences in with other groups who experience sexual exclusion for 
different reasons, may be tantamount to silencing or overlooking the unique 
nature of the injustice suffered by transgender person. This would then 
perpetuate the unique injustice they suffer. 
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This doesn’t mean that we should not be vigilant against the risk of 
stigmatisation. The risk is real whenever we mark out some group of people as 
being ‘different’ from everyone else. We should do our best to combat the 
stigma and potential shame around unjust sexual exclusion (just as we should 
combat the stigma and shame around other forms of unjust impoverishment 
such as the frequent stigmatisation of those in poverty). In short, we should be 
alert to the potential double-stigmatisation that Liberman highlights, but in 
being alert to this risk we may still find it necessary to recognise that some 
groups experience sexual exclusion in unique and special ways. We should do 
this by encouraging empathy and sympathy, not hostility and shame.  
 
 
7. The Social Engineering Objection 
The fourth objection is the Social Engineering Objection. This objection 
holds that the project of fostering greater sexual inclusion should be rejected on 
the grounds that it would require a dystopian, fruitless and possibly unjust 
exercise in social engineering. There are at least two different ways of running 
this objection.  
 
The first way will be particularly appealing to those who think there are 
certain ‘hard’ natural limits to the malleability of our sexual drives and 
preferences. Proponents of evolutionary psychology, for example, might argue 
that male and female sexual psyches have evolved to desire certain kinds of 
sexual experience and certain kinds of sexual partner (Buss 2003; Eisenman 
2006; Fleischman 2018). To use the common view (as it applies to heterosexual 
persons): men have evolved to desire young-ish, fertile-looking women and are 
very keen on casual sexual encounters; women have evolved to want slightly 
older, more financially stable men who will nurture and care for children. This 
is revealed through actual sexual behaviour and practice, even if it is denied by 
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the people who engage in those practice. Furthermore, even though our cultures 
are quite removed from the original context in which these sexual psyches 
evolved, and there is noticeable cultural variation in sexual beliefs and 
practices, these evolved psyches still exert a gravitational pull. They limit what 
it is possible to change through social reform. As one proponent puts it, 
specifically in response to claims by feminists and social progressives about 
reforming pornography and sex technology, people “underestimate the degree to 
which evolved psychology, rather than culture or technology, shape [sexual] 
attitudes” (Fleischmann 2018). 
 
There are several things to be said in response to this version of the 
objection. For starters, it should be noted that the evolutionary psychology 
theory of sexual behaviour is highly contested, and there are many criticisms of 
the research findings that are supposed to support the theory (Prinz 2012; Dupre 
2001; Buller 2005). This is not the place to litigate the debate about these 
findings.12 We can simply note the controversy and the fact that its existence 
means some people won’t be inclined to take this objection seriously. But if we 
accept the theory, and believe that there are natural limits to the malleability of 
sexual desire, this should not lead us to reject the ideal of fostering greater 
sexual exclusion. One reason for this is that we can foster greater sexual 
inclusion without having to reengineer people’s evolved sexual preferences and 
desires. Oftentimes, fostering greater sexual inclusion is as simple as removing 
unjust legal barriers to sexual activity. Other times it is just about educating 
people to make the best use of their evolved sexual psyches, e.g. through 
learning how to maximise or optimise their own sexual pleasure and the 
pleasure of their partners. Providing technological aids, including sex toys and 
                                                                    
12 For what it is worth, my view is that some of the findings are weak and relatively unpersuasive. But this is 
true of many findings in psychology, as the recent replication crisis has revealed. Nevertheless, I think some 
findings are fairly robust and have held up well under repeated scrutiny. For example, the finding that men (on 
average and in most contexts) are more willing to engage in casual sexual encounters than women, seems to be 
fairly robust. For an extensive review of the research literature on this particular finding see Schmitt 2017. 
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robots, to the sexually excluded is another way to foster their inclusion without 
conflicting with evolved preferences. Indeed, Diana Fleischmann, who believes 
that there are some strict evolved limits to the malleability of sexual desire, sees 
sex robots as a potential way to address problems of perceived sexual exclusion, 
particularly among men (Fleischman 2018). She does not express this argument 
in moral terms, but others, such as Di Nucci (2017) have defended the idea in 
moralistic terms. Another reason for rejecting the argument is that even if 
fostering greater sexual exclusion does require some social reengineering of 
sexual preferences, it is not clear that it would push it beyond the natural limits. 
There is already a rich diversity to human sexual interests and practices — as 
the existence of innumerable sexual fetishes reveals — so it is possible that 
there is more room to play with than we might first suppose. Providing means 
by which people with those unusual fetishes could find one another might be 
part of the project of sexual inclusion. It could also be that through deliberate 
conscious effort and training some people can reengineer their sexual 
preferences to match moral values in ways we did not think possible.13 Finally, 
it should be noted that some natural limits could be overcome through 
biotechnological tinkering with our sexual psyches. We already do this to some 
extent — e.g. through suppressing sexual urges with the use of so-called 
‘chemical castration’ — and it is possible that we will be able to do it to a 
greater extent in the future. Of course, whether we should do it depends on 
whether biological tinkering of this form is morally justified. That is a topic that 
lies beyond the scope of this article. 
 
                                                                    
13 An anonymous reviewer highlighted an episode of the Invisibilia podcast which discusses the extent to which 
it is possible to change our sexual preferences and recounts the story of a young woman who has tried to hack 
her racial preferences in dating so that they match closer with her moral values. See Invisibilia Episode ‘A Very 
Offensive Rom-Com’, 5th April 2019, available at https://www.npr.org/programs/invisibilia/710046991/a-very-
offensive-rom-com?t=1574953721220. This is an interesting case study and I would encourage readers to listen 
to this episode. 
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This brings us to the second way of running the Social Engineering 
Objection. You don’t have to be an evolutionary psychologist to worry about 
socially reengineering someone’s sexual preferences, beliefs and practices. As 
Amia Srinivasan (2018) points out, a core tenet of an enlightened liberal (sex 
positive) approach to sex is that, to a large extent, an individual’s sexual 
preferences are their own business. They want whatever it is that they want. If 
that means they exclude some people from the ambit of sexual experience, then 
who are we to question it? Anything goes in the bedroom, as long as it is 
consensual. If we tried to tinker with or alter people’s sexual preferences, 
beliefs and practices to make them more inclusive, we would be unjustly 
violating their sexual autonomy. 
 
Several of the responses to the evolutionary psychology argument are 
apposite once again. Fostering greater sexual inclusion does not necessarily 
entail unjust social engineering of this sort: we don’t have to force people to 
find others sexually attractive when that’s not what they want. We can foster 
greater sexual inclusion by enabling people to work with the sexual preferences, 
beliefs and desires that they have. But we should also be reluctant to assume 
that we can never justly question or challenge someone’s sexual preferences, 
beliefs and desires. We already do this to some extent — we don’t tolerate the 
sexual preferences of the rapist or paedophile — and there is no reason to think 
we shouldn’t do it a little more. Again, as Srinivasan points out, if we treat 
sexual preferences as unquestionable and axiomatic givens then we: 
  
“…risk covering not only for misogyny, but for racism, ableism, 
transphobia, and every other oppressive system that makes its way into the 
bedroom through the seemingly innocuous mechanism of ‘personal 
preference’.” (Srinivasan 2018)  
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Calling these preferences into question doesn’t mean forcing people into 
sexual encounters against their will, but it does mean encouraging them to take 
a more critical, reflective attitude toward their own sexual psyches and not 
treating them as sacred, axiomatic truths. There is a role for enlightened sex 
education here. This is a position that has already been defended in the literature 
on sexual preferences and race. For example, Zheng (2016) argues that a racial 
preference for Asian women is objectionable, even when it stems from purely 
aesthetic preferences as opposed to some racist ideology. Similarly, Mitchell 
and Wells (2018) argue that it is possible to reconcile the claim that racial 
exclusions in dating are morally undesirable with the view that people are 
generally justified in choosing their dating partners as they see fit. In doing so 
they argue that there are moral reasons to encourage people to change their 
dating preferences if they are racially exclusive. These arguments focus on the 
link between racism and sexual/intimate partner preferences, but the analysis 
can, presumably, be broadened to cover other forms of unjust sexual exclusion. 
If so, then this reinforces the argument being made in this paper: there are 
compelling moral reasons to work towards greater sexual inclusion in attitudes.  
 
That said, we have to make sure we do not engage in an unjust and unfruitful 
form of brainwashing in the process. This might be one place where it is 
important to think about the precise scope of any positive claim right to sexual 
inclusion. An excluded person might have a positive right to have sex education 
classes include the information pertaining to the malleability of sexual 
preferences and the problem of sexual exclusion, but this does not imply nor 
should it be taken to imply that they have a positive right to demand that 
someone else find them sexually attractive.15 
 
                                                                    
15 This is analogous to the argument made by Firth (2019) about the distinction between a right to demand 
funding for sexual services versus a right to demand those services. 
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8. Other Miscellaneous Objections 
These four objections would seem to be the major ones. Are there any others 
that should give us pause? Possibly. There is, for example, Amia Srinivasan’s 
concern that sexual experience is a sui generis phenomenon that cannot and 
should not be analogised to other distributive goods. She makes this point by 
discussing the ‘sex is not a sandwich’ example that was raised in the 
introduction to this article . As she puts it: 
 
“…whereas you can quite reasonably demand that a group of children share 
their sandwiches inclusively, you just can’t do the same with sex…Sex isn’t a 
sandwich, and it isn’t really like anything else either. There is nothing else so 
riven with politics and yet so inviolably personal. For better or worse, we must 
find a way to take sex on its own terms.” (Srinivasan 2018) 
 
This is an appealing line of thought. It encourages us to treat sexual 
experience as a unique part of human life. But it can be resisted. No analogy is 
perfect. All distributive goods are slightly different from one another. Money is 
not like education and education is not like healthcare, at least not in all 
respects. But they share enough in common to make thinking about them in 
terms of distributive justice appropriate. The same is true of sexual experience. 
It is an important part of a flourishing human life. Some people are given more 
sexual opportunities than others. Some are unjustly excluded. It makes sense to 
think about how we can ensure greater equality of sexual opportunity. It is, of 
course, absurd to think that we can demand that people share sexual experience 
with others (as they might share a sandwich) but at the risk of sounding like a 
broken record, recognising a right to sexual inclusion does not require this. 
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Another objection that might give us some pause has to do with the practical 
consequences of recognising that some people are not unjustly sexual excluded 
and that some of the unjustly excluded should have priority over others when it 
comes to the distribution of relevant goods and services. Both of these points 
have been relied upon above when responding to other criticisms. But some 
people might worry that this will encourage us to divide the world up into the 
deserving and undeserving sexual poor, and to undertake intrusive 
investigations into people’s lives to see whether they really are unjustly sexually 
excluded and in need of some assistance.  
 
This is a serious concern. It is, however, a not uncommon problem. It also 
arises with the distribution of other socially important goods and services (e.g. 
welfare payments and healthcare). It’s not clear that the mere fact that it could 
arise is enough to discourage us from taking the problem of sexual exclusion 
seriously. Still, it would be regrettable if we made our distributive system more 
intrusive and challenging for people suffering from multiple forms of social 
exclusion. Fortunately, many of the measures that are entailed by recognising a 
right to sexual inclusion need not entail the intrusive surveillance and 
investigation of already vulnerable populations. Removing bans and criminal 
restrictions on certain kinds of sexual activity can be done without any of this; 
and providing enlightened sex education (and certain kinds of sex aid and sex 
toy) is something that can be mainstreamed and thereby benefit everyone (just 
as consent classes and anti-discrimination classes can help everyone). The 
provision of specialised sex aids and sex toys, and specialised forms of sex 
education, might be different, but presumably these could work on top of 
existing forms of benefit provision for the relevant target populations and need 
not entail additional investigation or surveillance. 
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There may be other unintended consequences that result from taking the 
problem of sexual exclusion seriously. It is hard to imagine them all up front. 
Constant vigilance and scrutiny will be required to ensure that any scheme for 
fostering greater sexual inclusion is achieving its desired ends. This is true for 
all schemes of distributive justice. Perhaps schemes for sexual inclusion are 
fraught with more risks and warrant greater vigilance but this should not 
dissuade us from pursuing them. 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is appropriate to view sexual experience as a distributive 
good that can be evaluated in light of the principles of distributive justice. Some 
people are unjustly excluded from meaningful sexual experience and it makes 
sense to think about what we can do to ensure greater equality of sexual 
opportunity. Furthermore, the recognition of some bundle of rights to sexual 
inclusion is a plausible inference from this distributive view of sexual 
experience. There are several important objections to both of these claims, but 
none of them is sufficiently serious to scupper the entire project of fostering 
greater sexual inclusion. At most, they give us reason to pursue that project with 
caution and vigilance. 
 
Let us close by addressing one final criticism of the thesis presented in this 
article. Some people might worry that in defending the idea of sexual inclusion 
an implausibly delicate balancing act has been undertaken. For example, the 
potential reasonableness of rights to sexual inclusion has been defended by 
pointing out that we have already, implicitly, been treating sexual experience as 
a distributive good and reforming our legal systems so as to foster greater 
sexual inclusion (e.g. by reforming laws on the criminalisation of 
homosexuality; birth control provision etc). This has been a core part of the 
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rhetorical strategy — to suggest that what has been argued is not unprecedented 
or unusual. Furthermore, by responding to criticism, it has been suggested that 
the project of sexual inclusion can be pursued in a way that avoids ethical 
pitfalls and risks. But the worry might be that in the effort to make the project 
reasonable it has become uninteresting. It has been killed through excessive 
qualification and caution. In the end, it turns out that there is nothing new or 
fresh in the idea because all the potentially controversial implications have been 
disavowed. 
 
But is that a fair criticism? Although the reasonableness of the thesis has 
been stressed, it has not been stripped it of all its novelty. For one thing, a more 
explicit and direct engagement with the problem of sexual exclusion has been 
urged, which thereby highlights a neglected and important desideratum in any 
theory of justice. It has been argued that distinct debates about disability, sexual 
orientation, transgender rights, and feminism can all be unified and explained 
by a common underlying concern for greater sexual inclusion. Furthermore, the 
kinds of positive and negative claim rights that form part of the right to sexual 
inclusion are not meaningless or tokenistic. They can make a genuine difference 
to many people’s lives and change how we think about the substantive content 
of distributive justice. 
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